ETT EXEMPEL:
Ålänningar har alla tider varit bra på att hitta vägar och nya lösningar för sin tillvaro. Kan skattebehörigheten vara en sådan väg i dagens EU?
Det uppskattade seminariet om egen skattebehörighet för självstyrande regioner i EU (arrangerad av partiet Ålands Framtid den 18.9.) visade tydligt två aspekter i dessa strävanden. Å ena sidan tycks intresset vara stort i Europa och således lönar det sig även för Åland att vara med om detta arbete. Å andra sidan kom det lika tydligt fram hur tuff part EU är att arbeta med, vilket media nästan aldrig vill nämna i sina referat från den här typen av seminarier.
Föreläsarna hade dessa erfarenheter att dela med sig angående samarbetet med EU:
1. Kommissionen ingriper nationella konstitutioner
varje dag, att den inte skulle göra det är absoluta fantasier! Å andra sidan du må ha något i den nationella grundlagen, men det gäller inte eftersom EU-lagen ovanför. I fördragets vill EU även nå kommunala nivån.
2. Autonomin borde mer eller mindre vara godkänd av fördraget först innan man kan förvänta sig något av EU. Just nu är det så att alla selektiva element är bort- gallrade i Lissabon-fördraget. Till exempel Baskiens skattesystem är noterat i Spanien, men inte i fördraget.
3. Om en autonomi hellre skulle vilja se att det är rådet och inte kommissionen som agerar gentemot autonomierna, så är det långt ifrån verkligheten att EU:s dom- stol skulle notera sådana önskemål.
4. Det är nämligen viktigt att veta vad domstolen, som har mycket makt, använder som referensdokument för att man kan veta huruvida vissa skattebehörighetssträvanden är realistiska eller inte. EU-domstolen är alltså en stark institution i frågan och kommer att agera i framtiden. Vi har ”troubletime ahead”.
5. Rätten har dessutom aldrig ändrat sig på grund av någon subsidiaritet, som är ett extremt komplext politikiskt instrument. Hemskt att subnationella parlamentariker är så entusiastiska om detta (Jfr. åländska politiker !).
6. Dessutom fick till exempel Azorerna inte själva representera sig på EU-rätten.
7. För att få några undantag över huvud taget måste ett land vara enhetligt och självständigt.
8. Vissa skatteprocent kan variera inom EU, men inte systemet ! I fallet Azorerna var konkurrens med företagsskatt ok, men inte med inkomstskatt.
9. Regionkommittén har aldrig gjort sitt heller !
10. Regeringar tappar inte makt, utan parlamenten gör. Regeringarna ska inte få all makt (Jfr nya partier uppstår i Europa och ställer upp i val)!
- Ändå orkar man skapa nya lobbyorganisationer (= och fortsätta dagdrömma), med
EU-medel. Lycka till!
tisdag 5 oktober 2010
onsdag 17 mars 2010
39. EU-KRITISKA EUROPA DEBATTERAR EKONOMI
Varje krig har fått sin början mitt i bland någon typ av problem med att upprätthålla välfärden. Nu är Europa på väg dit igen, oroligheterna ökar.
Men helhetsbilden av det ekonomiska läget inom EU suddas ut genom att media fokuserar på ett land i sänder, just nu på Grekland, och målar upp bilder av olydiga skurkar. Däremot så består den EU-kritiska ekonomidebatten som bäst av många temaområden, vilket utgör en intressant helhet:
1. EU-systemet orsaken: Den liberala EU-marknaden är i sig en orsak till Europas finanskris och det har skapat så kallade ”dark pools”. Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) har agerat som importör av den ekonomiska krisen från USA. Men euro skyddar inte mot monetära oväder och ECB:s regler och politik skapar bestående sociala problem inom EU. Parallellt har den offentliga sektorn blivit fångar hos europeiska finansjättar, vars tillväxt den inte mera vågar kritisera. Lobbarsystemet i EU stöder dessa aktörers agerande.
2. Den verkliga skuldbilden: I och med krisen exploderade den offentliga skuld- sättningen och eurozonens värde sjönk. Den offentliga skulden har ökat från 66 procent 2007 till 83,6 procent 2010 (källa: Eurostat). Den ursprungliga tillåtna maximigränsen låg på 60% som också Finland just nådd. Men man ska se helheten som består av hushållens, företagens och offentliga sektorns skuldsättning. På så sätt har till exempel Frankrike en skuldsättning på 199,5 procent, Tyskland 202,7 procent, Spanien 269,3 procent, England 255,0 procent och Italien 221procent, vilket kan jämföras med USA:s 240 procent!
3. Fattigdomen når allt fler: Vi befinner oss i den värsta ekonomiska krisen sedan 1929 och de svaga förbättringarna sedan slutet av 2009 är ingalunda bestående. Man anser att den verkliga fattigdomen sätts igång från och med 2011 eller 2012. Det är viktigt att notera att nu blir också medelklassen utsatt för sämre ekonomi och även fattigdom. Exempelvis har 50% av Frankrikes låginkomsttagare inte haft någon reell lönehöjning sedan 1999. Och bland annat Spanien har redan aviserat att det blir massiva nedskärningar inom den sociala och hälsosektorn.
4. EU-institutionernas egen ekonomi: Redan under femton år har Revisionsrätten kritiserat kommissionen för att största delen av utbetalningarna, d.v.s. 85 miljarder euro per år, inte kan anses vara legala eller regelmässiga, vilket gäller de flesta av budgetens utgiftsposter. Men massiv EU-propaganda får skattebetalarna stå för.
5. EU:s utvidgning: Vi har betalat dyrt för utvidgning av EU utan politisk nytta, EU är inte mera någon nödvändig ram och inte heller tillväxtmotor. Sedan två år tillbaka har integrationsstödet till Turkiet (att bli medlem) fyrfaldigats, vilket betyder 4,873 miljarder euro i diverse projektstöd för perioden 2007-2013. Kommissionen kritiseras för bristande styrning och definitioner samt obefintlig evaluering av projekten.
6. Nya allianser: Det har förutspåtts en oundviklig allians mellan arbetar- och medelklassen, vilket konfronterar direkt med den europeiska minoritetsklass av beslutsfattare som nu lever globalt, mer eller mindre utan vardagsanknytning till en nationalstat eller självstyrande region. Därför kommer två frågor att ivrigt debatteras inför kommande val, Europarlamentets assistentroll, det vill säga gentemot verkliga globala beslutsfattare och invandrarfrågan.
... för att inte tala om arbetslöshet ...
Bland annat på grund av allt detta hävdar jag att EU inte är något fredsprojekt utan slår sönder Europa.
___________________________________________________________
ETT LITET TILLÄGG FRÅN 6.9.2011 FÖR DEM SOM LÄSER ENGELSKA
EN AV MÅNGA KRITISKA ANALYSER OM OCH KRING EURON:
___________________________________________________________
UBS Investment Research
Global Economic Perspectives
Euro break-up – the consequences
The Euro should not exist (like this)
Under the current structure and with the current membership, the Euro does notwork. Either the current structure will have to change, or the current membershipwill have to change.
Fiscal confederation, not break-up
Our base case with an overwhelming probability is that the Euro moves slowly(and painfully) towards some kind of fiscal integration. The risk case, of break-up,is considerably more costly and close to zero probability. Countries can not beexpelled, but sovereign states could choose to secede. However, popular discussionof the break-up option considerably underestimates the consequences of such amove.
The economic cost (part 1)
The cost of a weak country leaving the Euro is significant. Consequences includesovereign default, corporate default, collapse of the banking system and collapse of international trade. There is little prospect of devaluation offering much assistance.We estimate that a weak Euro country leaving the Euro would incur a cost of around EUR9,500 to EUR11,500 per person in the exiting country during the firstyear. That cost would then probably amount to EUR3,000 to EUR4,000 per personper year over subsequent years. That equates to a range of 40% to 50% of GDP inthe first year.
The economic cost (part 2)
Were a stronger country such as Germany to leave the Euro, the consequenceswould include corporate default, recapitalisation of the banking system andcollapse of international trade. If Germany were to leave, we believe the cost to bearound EUR6,000 to EUR8,000 for every German adult and child in the first year,and a range of EUR3,500 to EUR4,500 per person per year thereafter. That is theequivalent of 20% to 25% of GDP in the first year. In comparison, the cost of bailing out Greece, Ireland and Portugal entirely in the wake of the default of thosecountries would be a little over EUR1,000 per person, in a single hit.
The political cost
The economic cost is, in many ways, the least of the concerns investors shouldhave about a break-up. Fragmentation of the Euro would incur political costs.Europe’s “soft power” influence internationally would cease (as the concept of “Europe” as an integrated polity becomes meaningless). It is also worth observingthat almost no modern fiat currency monetary unions have broken up without someform of authoritarian or military government, or civil war
Men helhetsbilden av det ekonomiska läget inom EU suddas ut genom att media fokuserar på ett land i sänder, just nu på Grekland, och målar upp bilder av olydiga skurkar. Däremot så består den EU-kritiska ekonomidebatten som bäst av många temaområden, vilket utgör en intressant helhet:
1. EU-systemet orsaken: Den liberala EU-marknaden är i sig en orsak till Europas finanskris och det har skapat så kallade ”dark pools”. Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) har agerat som importör av den ekonomiska krisen från USA. Men euro skyddar inte mot monetära oväder och ECB:s regler och politik skapar bestående sociala problem inom EU. Parallellt har den offentliga sektorn blivit fångar hos europeiska finansjättar, vars tillväxt den inte mera vågar kritisera. Lobbarsystemet i EU stöder dessa aktörers agerande.
2. Den verkliga skuldbilden: I och med krisen exploderade den offentliga skuld- sättningen och eurozonens värde sjönk. Den offentliga skulden har ökat från 66 procent 2007 till 83,6 procent 2010 (källa: Eurostat). Den ursprungliga tillåtna maximigränsen låg på 60% som också Finland just nådd. Men man ska se helheten som består av hushållens, företagens och offentliga sektorns skuldsättning. På så sätt har till exempel Frankrike en skuldsättning på 199,5 procent, Tyskland 202,7 procent, Spanien 269,3 procent, England 255,0 procent och Italien 221procent, vilket kan jämföras med USA:s 240 procent!
3. Fattigdomen når allt fler: Vi befinner oss i den värsta ekonomiska krisen sedan 1929 och de svaga förbättringarna sedan slutet av 2009 är ingalunda bestående. Man anser att den verkliga fattigdomen sätts igång från och med 2011 eller 2012. Det är viktigt att notera att nu blir också medelklassen utsatt för sämre ekonomi och även fattigdom. Exempelvis har 50% av Frankrikes låginkomsttagare inte haft någon reell lönehöjning sedan 1999. Och bland annat Spanien har redan aviserat att det blir massiva nedskärningar inom den sociala och hälsosektorn.
4. EU-institutionernas egen ekonomi: Redan under femton år har Revisionsrätten kritiserat kommissionen för att största delen av utbetalningarna, d.v.s. 85 miljarder euro per år, inte kan anses vara legala eller regelmässiga, vilket gäller de flesta av budgetens utgiftsposter. Men massiv EU-propaganda får skattebetalarna stå för.
5. EU:s utvidgning: Vi har betalat dyrt för utvidgning av EU utan politisk nytta, EU är inte mera någon nödvändig ram och inte heller tillväxtmotor. Sedan två år tillbaka har integrationsstödet till Turkiet (att bli medlem) fyrfaldigats, vilket betyder 4,873 miljarder euro i diverse projektstöd för perioden 2007-2013. Kommissionen kritiseras för bristande styrning och definitioner samt obefintlig evaluering av projekten.
6. Nya allianser: Det har förutspåtts en oundviklig allians mellan arbetar- och medelklassen, vilket konfronterar direkt med den europeiska minoritetsklass av beslutsfattare som nu lever globalt, mer eller mindre utan vardagsanknytning till en nationalstat eller självstyrande region. Därför kommer två frågor att ivrigt debatteras inför kommande val, Europarlamentets assistentroll, det vill säga gentemot verkliga globala beslutsfattare och invandrarfrågan.
... för att inte tala om arbetslöshet ...
Bland annat på grund av allt detta hävdar jag att EU inte är något fredsprojekt utan slår sönder Europa.
___________________________________________________________
ETT LITET TILLÄGG FRÅN 6.9.2011 FÖR DEM SOM LÄSER ENGELSKA
EN AV MÅNGA KRITISKA ANALYSER OM OCH KRING EURON:
___________________________________________________________
UBS Investment Research
Global Economic Perspectives
Euro break-up – the consequences
The Euro should not exist (like this)
Under the current structure and with the current membership, the Euro does notwork. Either the current structure will have to change, or the current membershipwill have to change.
Fiscal confederation, not break-up
Our base case with an overwhelming probability is that the Euro moves slowly(and painfully) towards some kind of fiscal integration. The risk case, of break-up,is considerably more costly and close to zero probability. Countries can not beexpelled, but sovereign states could choose to secede. However, popular discussionof the break-up option considerably underestimates the consequences of such amove.
The economic cost (part 1)
The cost of a weak country leaving the Euro is significant. Consequences includesovereign default, corporate default, collapse of the banking system and collapse of international trade. There is little prospect of devaluation offering much assistance.We estimate that a weak Euro country leaving the Euro would incur a cost of around EUR9,500 to EUR11,500 per person in the exiting country during the firstyear. That cost would then probably amount to EUR3,000 to EUR4,000 per personper year over subsequent years. That equates to a range of 40% to 50% of GDP inthe first year.
The economic cost (part 2)
Were a stronger country such as Germany to leave the Euro, the consequenceswould include corporate default, recapitalisation of the banking system andcollapse of international trade. If Germany were to leave, we believe the cost to bearound EUR6,000 to EUR8,000 for every German adult and child in the first year,and a range of EUR3,500 to EUR4,500 per person per year thereafter. That is theequivalent of 20% to 25% of GDP in the first year. In comparison, the cost of bailing out Greece, Ireland and Portugal entirely in the wake of the default of thosecountries would be a little over EUR1,000 per person, in a single hit.
The political cost
The economic cost is, in many ways, the least of the concerns investors shouldhave about a break-up. Fragmentation of the Euro would incur political costs.Europe’s “soft power” influence internationally would cease (as the concept of “Europe” as an integrated polity becomes meaningless). It is also worth observingthat almost no modern fiat currency monetary unions have broken up without someform of authoritarian or military government, or civil war
onsdag 27 januari 2010
38. VET INTE, BERÄTTAR INTE (EU-beskattning)
TILLÄGG ANGÅENDE CH:S KOMMENTAR 30.1.
Väl magstarkt av CH att påstå att vi "i sak är överens",CH visste inte ens om vad som pågår eller så vill han inte berätta !
Att mina kommentarer ännu var så pass "sakliga" får CH vara tacksam för. Själv är han allt annat än saklig, det vill säga vet ingenting och/eller berättar ingenting om ytterst viktiga frågor !!!!!!!!
***
Jag tackar parlamentariker Carl Haglund för svaret till min fråga om EU-beskattning. Du vet ingenting och ”hoppas” att det inte blir någon beskattning heller. Eftersom jag inte deltar i ”stafettkarnevaler” utan samlar information i stället, så vet jag tydligen mer.
Att någon Mepp (parlamentariker) idag gillar eller inte tanken om EU-beskattning har försvinnande lite betydelse. Jag har redan för några år sedan påpekat att kommissionens tidning i Sverige, Europaposten, visste i sitt nummer 3/2008 berätta om förberedelser, där också finländare varit med (www.eukomm.se).
Och parallellt har Europas kritiska rörelser hållit på att följa den här oroande utvecklingen. Så här ser det ut i mina anteckningar:
1. “Egna resurser” heter det ständigt pågående projektet i syfte att styra allt mer medel till EU, när man inte täcks öppet säga att nuvarande medel inte räcker till att bygga vidare superstaten EU.
2. På ett möte i Helsingfors 7.3.2006 med Alain Lamassoure (den ständiga rapportören för projektet), Ulla-Maj Wideroos (finansministeriet) och Jari Koskinen (någon beskattningskommitté i riksdagen) konstaterades att AL ”var övertygad om att i något skede en del av nationell skatt borde överföras till unionen. Alltså ”del av någon nationell skatt så att landets budget inte behöver belastas med detta”.
3. Eftersom det skulle bli för dyrt för EU att beskatta länderna, så ”skulle det vara mycket enklare att utnyttja någon skatt som redan existerar i alla medlemsländer”.
4. För Finlands del gällde det då att fatta beslut om huruvida man landet vill åstadkomma något sådant. Och det vill ju beslutsfattande eliten i Finland (och Åland?) så gärna!
Jag bifogar texten ( det är Finlands bidrag i sammanhanget) till denna insändare på min hemsida (www.merjarenvall.blogspot.com) och återkommer med mera detaljer. Nu säger jag bara detta: Meppar är ofta springpojkar och –flickor i ett större spel. De vet inte ens alla gånger vad medlemmar i det egna partiet sysslar med. Det har vi bevis på här. Och sådana skall sedan ta hand om åländska frågor för oss? Hissa flaggor i Bryssel, vad?
Till vanliga ålänningar säger jag det här: den som enbart funderar på enstaka projektbidrag är samma som att fokusera på att anordna bal under tiden båten sjunker redan. För vad tror ni att det betyder när man börjar styra skattemedel till EU? Bättre löner och pensioner och arbetsplatser för unga, typ?
TEXTEN JAG HÄNVISAR TILL OVAN:
MEETINGS OF ALAIN LAMASSOURE,
STANDING RAPPORTEUR FOR OWN RESOURCES
HELSINKI, 7 MARCH 2006
Participants:
Mr. Alain LAMASSOURE (AL), Standing rapporteur on own resources
Secretariat: Mrs. Monika STRASSER, Administrator
Mme Ulla-Maj WIDEROOS (UMW), Minister responsible for own resources, Ministry of Finance
Mr. Jari KOSKINEN (JK), Chairman of the Sub-committee on taxation, Eduskunta
1) Meeting with Mme Ulla-Maj Wideroos, Minister responsible for own resources, Ministry of Finance, 16: 15 hours
AL commenced the meeting by giving some background information on the reasons for his meetings with the national parliaments. He reminded that the own resources were not a community competence but one of the Member States. This was why he was aiming at finding a common proposal of EP and national parliaments in order to prepare for the review of expenditure and revenue that was supposed to take place in 2008.
AL spoke out in favour of a 2-stages-approach: First, the current system should be improved by making it fairer, simpler and more transparent. Secondly, a new genuine own resource should be introduced as per 2013.
In response to UMW 's question, if he had had any feedback on this from other Member States, AL explained that there had not been much reaction so far. Net-beneficiaries were happy with the current situation, anyway, while net-contributors who were not happy with the current situation had been made happy by the latest British proposals.
AL reminded that the amounts at stake were very low. He was convinced that, at some stage, part of a national tax would have to be allocated to the Union. There had to be a treaty or an inter-institutional agreement by which Member States decided to allocate, for some time, part of some national tax to the Union without first charging the national budget with it. This treaty or agreement would require unanimity in Council and ratification by all national parliaments.
For UMW the first stage towards achieving a result was taking the decision on whether to try and accomplish this by many small steps or by one large step.
AL preferred a gradual progressive approach. However, he pointed out that if the new system should be applied as from 2013, negotiations should start without delay.
To UMW's question how realistic these proposals were, AL responded that by mid-2006 he hoped to have received the first position of half of the countries. They should be a representative sample of big and small, rich and poor, and old and new Member States.
It was only logical that a Union of 28 could not be financed with the same funds as a Union of 12. 1% of GNI was not enough, 1.1% or 1.07% or any other figure in this range was needed. However, none of the big countries wanted to pay the extra 0.1% or so. This was why a new system was needed.
UMW concluded the meeting by stating that Finland was always open for negotiations.
2) Meeting with Mr. Jari Koskinen, Chairman of the Sub-committee on taxation, Eduskunta, 17:30 hours
AL introduced the topic by describing the development of an original system of own resources, as in the beginning of the European Community, to a system of Member States' contributions as it was in place now, 20 years later. At the moment 90% of EU revenue came from VAT and GNI which had a lot of drawbacks like for example the dominance of the principle of just returns. Net contributors just wanted changes for their own situation and net-receivers were happy.
The current system needed to be updated, otherwise the policies decided by the European Council would not be implemented because the Member States had their own problems and could not even comply with the stability pact.
In its considerations of the reform of the own resources system, COBU wanted to work hand-in-hand with the national parliaments. The EP could do the stocktaking and could launch initiatives but the subject was in the competence of the Member States. The national parliaments had the power, the European Parliament had the vision.
On the procedure, AL explained that first the opinions of 10 - 12 parliaments should be collected. By the end of 2006 he hoped to have a resolution adopted which would enjoy broad consensus within the EP and amongst a majority of national parliaments.
In the current negotiations on IIA and financial perspective the governments should make a commitment to include a reform of own resources in the review process 2008.
His visit to Helsinki, AL stated, was to be seen in this context as part of a pre-, pre-, pre-, pre-negotiation. He wanted to find out which method Finland wanted and which timetable.
JK stressed that negotiations on this subject had been and would always be difficult. Finland had considered a GNI based resource the best way to finance the budget. They thought this was a fair indicator of the prosperity of a country. This would of course mean less weight on a VAT resource and a slow disappearance of traditional own resources.
Finland, for example, did not need the kind of CAP currently in place. However, if everybody in the Union agreed that cohesion and CAP were common tasks then there should also be an agreement on how to finance it.
JK underlined that the British rebate was not acceptable to Finland who considered it unfair. He also reminded that there was still some misuse of money and called for a better auditing system.
With regard to an EU tax, JK noted that people in Finland were very much against it. How could they know how this money would be used? Whether it went to the right places? JK was also doubtful if using part of an existing tax would work.
AL responded that the EP was not biased and open to all proposals. Fact was that the current system did not work and a new one needed to be found. The recent Finnish proposals on how to improve the current system had been very interesting in this respect.
Of course, it should be insisted upon that EU money was spent correctly, value for money should be guaranteed. However, AL reminded that the EP Committee on Budgetary Control worked together with the Court of Auditors in order to check on how EU money was spent.
According to AL, for the next few years a European tax would not make sense because only small amounts were needed. To introduce a new tax for some 300 million taxpayers to raise something like 1/1000 of GNI would just cause collection costs that were totally out of proportion.
It would be much simpler to use part of a tax existing in all Member States - maybe in connection with the common market. Thus, the additional wealth created by the internal market could be used to fund new EU policies. AL stressed once more that this did not mean raising the current level of VAT. The idea was, for example, to dedicate to the European Union budget a part of the VAT on goods imported into a Member State from another Member State. In parallel, the Member States' contributions to the EU budget would be decreased or abolished. Another possibility was the harmonisation of the profit tax - rates and tax bases - followed by part of it going directly into the EU budget.
AL underlined that, whatever way would be chosen, it would be a decision taken by a Member State to allocate part of their revenue directly to the Union and not a decision to grant the Union the right to levy taxes.
According to JK, tax harmonisation was not any problem for Finland. He knew that other Member States wanted tax competition. For Finland there was enough competition outside Europe.
JK found the VAT idea quite interesting since it would also help the Member States to make their own budgets and it would be transparent for the consumers. Concluding the meeting, he showed himself open to jointly look for other possible answers.
Väl magstarkt av CH att påstå att vi "i sak är överens",CH visste inte ens om vad som pågår eller så vill han inte berätta !
Att mina kommentarer ännu var så pass "sakliga" får CH vara tacksam för. Själv är han allt annat än saklig, det vill säga vet ingenting och/eller berättar ingenting om ytterst viktiga frågor !!!!!!!!
***
Jag tackar parlamentariker Carl Haglund för svaret till min fråga om EU-beskattning. Du vet ingenting och ”hoppas” att det inte blir någon beskattning heller. Eftersom jag inte deltar i ”stafettkarnevaler” utan samlar information i stället, så vet jag tydligen mer.
Att någon Mepp (parlamentariker) idag gillar eller inte tanken om EU-beskattning har försvinnande lite betydelse. Jag har redan för några år sedan påpekat att kommissionens tidning i Sverige, Europaposten, visste i sitt nummer 3/2008 berätta om förberedelser, där också finländare varit med (www.eukomm.se).
Och parallellt har Europas kritiska rörelser hållit på att följa den här oroande utvecklingen. Så här ser det ut i mina anteckningar:
1. “Egna resurser” heter det ständigt pågående projektet i syfte att styra allt mer medel till EU, när man inte täcks öppet säga att nuvarande medel inte räcker till att bygga vidare superstaten EU.
2. På ett möte i Helsingfors 7.3.2006 med Alain Lamassoure (den ständiga rapportören för projektet), Ulla-Maj Wideroos (finansministeriet) och Jari Koskinen (någon beskattningskommitté i riksdagen) konstaterades att AL ”var övertygad om att i något skede en del av nationell skatt borde överföras till unionen. Alltså ”del av någon nationell skatt så att landets budget inte behöver belastas med detta”.
3. Eftersom det skulle bli för dyrt för EU att beskatta länderna, så ”skulle det vara mycket enklare att utnyttja någon skatt som redan existerar i alla medlemsländer”.
4. För Finlands del gällde det då att fatta beslut om huruvida man landet vill åstadkomma något sådant. Och det vill ju beslutsfattande eliten i Finland (och Åland?) så gärna!
Jag bifogar texten ( det är Finlands bidrag i sammanhanget) till denna insändare på min hemsida (www.merjarenvall.blogspot.com) och återkommer med mera detaljer. Nu säger jag bara detta: Meppar är ofta springpojkar och –flickor i ett större spel. De vet inte ens alla gånger vad medlemmar i det egna partiet sysslar med. Det har vi bevis på här. Och sådana skall sedan ta hand om åländska frågor för oss? Hissa flaggor i Bryssel, vad?
Till vanliga ålänningar säger jag det här: den som enbart funderar på enstaka projektbidrag är samma som att fokusera på att anordna bal under tiden båten sjunker redan. För vad tror ni att det betyder när man börjar styra skattemedel till EU? Bättre löner och pensioner och arbetsplatser för unga, typ?
TEXTEN JAG HÄNVISAR TILL OVAN:
MEETINGS OF ALAIN LAMASSOURE,
STANDING RAPPORTEUR FOR OWN RESOURCES
HELSINKI, 7 MARCH 2006
Participants:
Mr. Alain LAMASSOURE (AL), Standing rapporteur on own resources
Secretariat: Mrs. Monika STRASSER, Administrator
Mme Ulla-Maj WIDEROOS (UMW), Minister responsible for own resources, Ministry of Finance
Mr. Jari KOSKINEN (JK), Chairman of the Sub-committee on taxation, Eduskunta
1) Meeting with Mme Ulla-Maj Wideroos, Minister responsible for own resources, Ministry of Finance, 16: 15 hours
AL commenced the meeting by giving some background information on the reasons for his meetings with the national parliaments. He reminded that the own resources were not a community competence but one of the Member States. This was why he was aiming at finding a common proposal of EP and national parliaments in order to prepare for the review of expenditure and revenue that was supposed to take place in 2008.
AL spoke out in favour of a 2-stages-approach: First, the current system should be improved by making it fairer, simpler and more transparent. Secondly, a new genuine own resource should be introduced as per 2013.
In response to UMW 's question, if he had had any feedback on this from other Member States, AL explained that there had not been much reaction so far. Net-beneficiaries were happy with the current situation, anyway, while net-contributors who were not happy with the current situation had been made happy by the latest British proposals.
AL reminded that the amounts at stake were very low. He was convinced that, at some stage, part of a national tax would have to be allocated to the Union. There had to be a treaty or an inter-institutional agreement by which Member States decided to allocate, for some time, part of some national tax to the Union without first charging the national budget with it. This treaty or agreement would require unanimity in Council and ratification by all national parliaments.
For UMW the first stage towards achieving a result was taking the decision on whether to try and accomplish this by many small steps or by one large step.
AL preferred a gradual progressive approach. However, he pointed out that if the new system should be applied as from 2013, negotiations should start without delay.
To UMW's question how realistic these proposals were, AL responded that by mid-2006 he hoped to have received the first position of half of the countries. They should be a representative sample of big and small, rich and poor, and old and new Member States.
It was only logical that a Union of 28 could not be financed with the same funds as a Union of 12. 1% of GNI was not enough, 1.1% or 1.07% or any other figure in this range was needed. However, none of the big countries wanted to pay the extra 0.1% or so. This was why a new system was needed.
UMW concluded the meeting by stating that Finland was always open for negotiations.
2) Meeting with Mr. Jari Koskinen, Chairman of the Sub-committee on taxation, Eduskunta, 17:30 hours
AL introduced the topic by describing the development of an original system of own resources, as in the beginning of the European Community, to a system of Member States' contributions as it was in place now, 20 years later. At the moment 90% of EU revenue came from VAT and GNI which had a lot of drawbacks like for example the dominance of the principle of just returns. Net contributors just wanted changes for their own situation and net-receivers were happy.
The current system needed to be updated, otherwise the policies decided by the European Council would not be implemented because the Member States had their own problems and could not even comply with the stability pact.
In its considerations of the reform of the own resources system, COBU wanted to work hand-in-hand with the national parliaments. The EP could do the stocktaking and could launch initiatives but the subject was in the competence of the Member States. The national parliaments had the power, the European Parliament had the vision.
On the procedure, AL explained that first the opinions of 10 - 12 parliaments should be collected. By the end of 2006 he hoped to have a resolution adopted which would enjoy broad consensus within the EP and amongst a majority of national parliaments.
In the current negotiations on IIA and financial perspective the governments should make a commitment to include a reform of own resources in the review process 2008.
His visit to Helsinki, AL stated, was to be seen in this context as part of a pre-, pre-, pre-, pre-negotiation. He wanted to find out which method Finland wanted and which timetable.
JK stressed that negotiations on this subject had been and would always be difficult. Finland had considered a GNI based resource the best way to finance the budget. They thought this was a fair indicator of the prosperity of a country. This would of course mean less weight on a VAT resource and a slow disappearance of traditional own resources.
Finland, for example, did not need the kind of CAP currently in place. However, if everybody in the Union agreed that cohesion and CAP were common tasks then there should also be an agreement on how to finance it.
JK underlined that the British rebate was not acceptable to Finland who considered it unfair. He also reminded that there was still some misuse of money and called for a better auditing system.
With regard to an EU tax, JK noted that people in Finland were very much against it. How could they know how this money would be used? Whether it went to the right places? JK was also doubtful if using part of an existing tax would work.
AL responded that the EP was not biased and open to all proposals. Fact was that the current system did not work and a new one needed to be found. The recent Finnish proposals on how to improve the current system had been very interesting in this respect.
Of course, it should be insisted upon that EU money was spent correctly, value for money should be guaranteed. However, AL reminded that the EP Committee on Budgetary Control worked together with the Court of Auditors in order to check on how EU money was spent.
According to AL, for the next few years a European tax would not make sense because only small amounts were needed. To introduce a new tax for some 300 million taxpayers to raise something like 1/1000 of GNI would just cause collection costs that were totally out of proportion.
It would be much simpler to use part of a tax existing in all Member States - maybe in connection with the common market. Thus, the additional wealth created by the internal market could be used to fund new EU policies. AL stressed once more that this did not mean raising the current level of VAT. The idea was, for example, to dedicate to the European Union budget a part of the VAT on goods imported into a Member State from another Member State. In parallel, the Member States' contributions to the EU budget would be decreased or abolished. Another possibility was the harmonisation of the profit tax - rates and tax bases - followed by part of it going directly into the EU budget.
AL underlined that, whatever way would be chosen, it would be a decision taken by a Member State to allocate part of their revenue directly to the Union and not a decision to grant the Union the right to levy taxes.
According to JK, tax harmonisation was not any problem for Finland. He knew that other Member States wanted tax competition. For Finland there was enough competition outside Europe.
JK found the VAT idea quite interesting since it would also help the Member States to make their own budgets and it would be transparent for the consumers. Concluding the meeting, he showed himself open to jointly look for other possible answers.
lördag 23 januari 2010
37. UTREDNING OM PROBLEM (EU-kostnader)
VILJAN ATT BERÄTTA OM EU-EKONOMIN
Redan i februari 2009 analyserade OpenEurope EU-lagstiftningens inverkan på Englands ekonomi med rubriken ”Kontrollen gått förlorad? Ett decennium av EU-lagstiftning”
I utredningen på ca 78 sidor kan man läsa att:
1. Såväl mängden av lagstiftning som kostnaderna föranledda av dem stiger hela tiden.
2. Antalet lagar har gått upp i raketfart, från 10.800 1998 till 26.500 2008.
3. Årliga kostnader för England har i samma takt gått upp från 16,6 biljoner (10 pund är drygt 11 euro) 2005 till 28,7 biljoner 2008 (dvs. en ökning på 74%).
4. Med sådana summor kunde England låta bli beskatta sitt folk under ett års tid eller alternativt avkorta statsskulden med 24%.
Den här takten betyder att kostnaderna för hela EU år 2018 blir 3,017 triljoner, vilket betyder över 15.000 euro per varje EU-hushåll. Liknande analyser håller man på med i Frankrike och Tyskland. Och det är klart att vi har motsvarande kostnader fast man liksom inte får säga det högt! Och så pratar våra politiker om minskning av byråkrati och offentlig sektor?
Sedan fick vi nyligen av europarlamentariker Carl Haglund veta att EU vill ”sätta grekerna på plats” och att de grekiska myndigheterna har förskönat de ekonomiska siffrorna och har åtminstone sedan 1997 fört unionen bakom ljuset, Greklands statsskuld förväntas klättra upp till 125 procent av BNP detta år samt att Grekland är långt ifrån det enda landet som brutit mot pakten och att kasta ut Grekland ur eurosamarbetet ter sig inte heller som ett attraktivt alternativ för någon.
Hagmans sätt att måla upp en EU som lyckas styra med hård hand övertygar inte kritikerna eftersom:
1. Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) håller på att febrilt analysera hur allt i juridisk menig skall lösas om/när ett eller flera länder lämnar valutaunionen (euron) och/eller EU. ECB behöver således inte ”kasta ut” några länder.
2. Det är flera länder som kämpar med sin statsskuld och skuldsättningsgrad på över 100% av BNP är ingen raritet mera.
3. Och finska finansministeriets chef uttalade sig nyligen om läget med uttrycket ”Finland ligger i djupt träsk”.
4. Och hur mycket och hur länge har inte EU själv fört sina medlemsländers befolkningar bakom ljuset med alla bedrägerier och oegentligheter! Inte berättar man öppet heller att EU-presidenten kostar oss skattebetalare 300-400 miljoner i form av lön, säkerhetsarrangemang, stab, kontorsbyggnad osv. Eller slagsmålet om EU- parlamentarikernas lönehöjning samtidigt när t.ex. Finlands regering(ar) ber det finska folket nöja sig med mindre i lön och pension!
Hej Carl Haglund, berätta oss hur det framskrider med EU-beskattningen, det där som man inte får kalla beskattning men som ändå blir det 2014? Vet du något om det? Eller skall det också lättsamt beskrivas som stafettkarneval?
DET HÄR ÄR SAMMANFATTANDE AVSNITT UR OPEN EUROPES UTREDNING OM HUR EU BELASTAR SINA MEDLEMSLÄNDER MED SIN LAGSTIFTNING (Jag kommer småningom att översätta åtminstone delar av dessa axplock):
Out of control? Measuring a decade of EU regulation February 2009 By Mats Persson with Stephen Booth & Sarah Gaskell Edited by Lorraine Mullally
KEY FINDINGS:
Both the number and cost of regulations are going up all the time
• Over the past decade, the number of laws produced in both Whitehall and Brussels has skyrocketed. The number of legal acts in force in the EU has gone from 10,800 in 1998, to over 26,500 in 2008.
• However, while the number of regulations adopted each year is a useful indicator of trends, a far more meaningful assessment of the burden of regulation is the relative cost of those regulations to the economy.
• Since the UK launched its ‘Regulatory Reform Agenda’ in 2005, the annual cost of regulation has gone from £16.5 billion in 2005 to £28.7 billion in 2008 — an enormous increase of 74%.
Since the UK launched its ‘Regulatory Reform Agenda’ in 2005, the annual cost of regulation has gone from £16.5 billion in 2005 to £28.7 billion in 2008— an enormous increase of 74%
• Meanwhile, the estimated cumulative cost of regulations introduced in the UK between 1998 and 2008 is £148.2 billion. This is the equivalent of 10% of GDR1
• For the same amount, the UK Government could abolish income tax for one year2 or cut the national debt by 24%. EU legislation is responsible for 72% of the cost of regulations in the UK
• Of the cumulative cost of regulations introduced over the past decade, £106.6 billion, or 71.9%, had its origin in the EU. Similarly, the EU proportion of the average annual cost of regulations is 71.6%. of the cumulative cost of regulations introduced over the past decade, £106.6 billion, or 71.9%, had its origin in the EU
• Overall, the cost of EU legislation has gone up steadily year-on-year over the past decade. ln 2008 alone, EU legislation dating from 1998 cost the UK economy £18.5 billion — up from £12.2 billion in 2005.
• Taking the cumulative cost estimates, EU legislation since 1998 has cost the UK 23% more than the UK’s total gross contributions to the EU budget over the period 1998-2008.
1 Caiculated assuming that UK GDP in 2008 was E1,461,301,000,000, see Eurostat
http:llepp.eurostat.ec.europa.eulportal/page?_pageid=0,1 1361 73,0_45570701 &_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
2 According to the Treasury’s Latest Public Finances Databank (December 2008), income tax amounted to £151.9 billion in 07108, see http:Ilwww.hm-treasury.gov.uk!psf_statistics.htm
3 According to ONS figures, March 2008, UK national debt was £614,400,000,000, see
http:Ilwww.statistics.gov.uklccilnugget.asp?ID=277
4 According to the Treasury, the UK’s gross contributions to the EU budget 1998-2008 were £86.34 billion, see http:Ilwww.hm-treasury.gov.uklint_eu_statefraud.htm
At the current rate EU legislation will cost the UKE356 billion by 2018
• If the current flow of regulation continues, by 2018, the cost of EU legislation introduced since 1998 will have risen to more than £356 billion.5 This is around f 14,300 per British household.6 For the same amount, the UK Government could pay off almost 60% of the national debt7, or abolish incometaxfor2yearsand still leave theTreasury with a surplus.8
EU labour market Iaws alone account for 21% of the total cost of UK regulations
• Labour market legislation introduced over the past ten years has cost the UK economy £45 billion. 69% of this —£31 billion — came from the EU. This means that 21% of the overall cost of new regulations introduced in the UK between 1998 and 2008 can be sourced to the EU’s labour market laws alone. For this amount, the UK Government could cut corporation tax by two-thirds.9
Meanwhile, EU health and safety legislation coming into force in the last decade has cost the UK £5.7 billion.
EU agricultural regulations have cost British farmers over £2 billion, and the EU food labelling requirements have cost the UK £1.7 billion over the last ten years.
BERR is the UK’S ‘regulation factory’, with 73% of its annual cost of regulation coming from the EU
• Among UK Government departments, BERR (formerly the DTI) is the main facilitator of regulation in the UK. If the UK has a ‘regulation factory’, this is it. ln 2008 alone, the department accounted for regulatory costs to the economy of £12.8 billion — 45% of the total cost of regulation in that year. This was roughly £4 billion more than in 2007— or a 45% increase.
• Over the past ten years, 72.7% of the average annual cost of the regulation imposed by BERR stemmed from Brussels. ln 2008, the cost from EU regulation administered through BERR was £5.9 billion. This is enough to cut the rate of corporation tax by an average of 13%.10
• ln 2008, a staggering £9 billion of the cost of regulations coming from BERR arose from labour market regulations, of which £3.6 billion came from the EU. ln tum, £2.1 billion of this was due to one single regulation —the EU’s infamous 1999 Working Time Directive.
EU regulation accounts for more than 90% of the total cost of regulations from some Whitehall departments
• Meanwhile, EU regulations account for 98.8% of the cumulative cost of regulations coming from the FSA, 96.5% of those coming from the Ministry of Justice, 94.2% of regulations from DEFRA, and 94.3% from the HSE.
EU regulations cost the EU €1.4 trillion
• The cumulative cost of regulation introduced between 1998 and 2008 for all 27 EU member states is €1.4 trillion. Of this, 66%, or €928 billion, is EU-sourced.
• If current trends continue, by 2018, the cost of EU regulation introduced since 1998 will have risen to more than €3.017 trillion. This is over €1 5,000 per household in the EU.
• Since the Commission launched its ‘Better Regulation Agenda’ in 2005, the annual cost of EU legislation across the bbc has gone from €108 billion to over €161 billion — an increase of 50%.
5 The figure is the Present Value of the cost, caiculated using the discount rate of 3.5 per Cent specified in the Treasury Green Book, see http:llgreenbook.treasury.gov.ukfchaptero5.htm#discounting
6 Based on ONS’s es-timate of the number of UK househoids at 24.9 million in 2006, see http:Ilwww.statistics.gov.uklcci/nugget.asp?id=1 866
7 According to ONS figures, March 2008, UK national debt was E614,400,000,000, see
http:Ilwww.statistics.gov.uklcci/nugget.asp?ID=277
8 According to the Treasury’s Latest Public Finances Databank (December 2008), income tax amounted to £151.9 billion in 07108, see http:IANww.hm-treasury.gov.uklpsf_statistics.htm
9 According to the Treasury’s Latest Public Finances Databank (December 2008), corporation tax receipts were £46.4 billion in 07108, see http:IANww.hm-treasury.gov.uklpsf_statistics.htm
10 According to the Treasury’s Latest Public Finances Databank (December 2008), corporation tax receipts were £46.4 billion in 07108, see http:IAwww.hm-treasury.gov.uklpsf_statistics.htm http:/vww.hm-treasury.gov.ukIpsf_statistics.htm
• In 2008 alone the cost of regulation for the EU27 was €269.5 billion. This is up from €229.6 billion in 2007 and €183.4 billion in 2006.
• The cumulative cost to Germany of regulation introduced since 1998 is a staggering €280 billion. Of this amount, €184 billion (66%) is sourced to EU legislation — which is the equivalent of over 7% of the country’s GDR11
• In France the cost was €211 billion, of which almost €144 billion — 68% — came from the EU.
The Government’s claims to have cut the cost of regulation do not stack up — the Government must focus much more of its efforts on the EU level
• There is a clear mismatch between our findings and the Government’s claims to have cut down the administrative cost and burden of regulations in the last few years.12 ln December 2008, for example, the Government said that the administrative burden had been cut by £1.9 billion compared to the 2005 baseline measure.13
• It seems unlikely that the net administrative cost of regulations could be falling, while the overall cost of regulation — as captured by our figures — is increasing 50 markedly. Especially given that both sets of findings are based on the Government’s own figures.
• The UK’s reform agenda is ambitious. However, because of the large proportion of regulation stemming from the EU, the UK is losing control of it. For example, the new idea for departmental regulatory budgets is a good one, but since the regulatory costs stemming from some departments are so heavily driven by EU legislation, it is difficult to imagine how ministers will be able to control the budgets in practice. With EU regulations accounting for around 72% of the annual average cost of UK regulations, the Government effectively has control of less than 30% of the annual cost of regulation.
UK ministers sometimes sign off on EU proposals despite the lmpact Assessment showing the costs outweighing the benefits
• ln 2007 the Minister of Transport Stephen Ladyman, for instance, approved an lmpact Assessment which showed that the estimated costs of an EU Directive were £400 million a year while the benefits were £18.5 million a year. This encapsulates the UK Government’s weak approach to negotiations on EU legislation.
The EU’s attempts to cut regu!ation are para!ysed by too much tinkering at the margins
• Over the years the Commission’s commitment to ‘better regulation’ has resulted in very few tangible benefits. Despite noble efforts by a handful of reform-minded Commissioners such as Gunther Verheugen, regulatory reform in the EU is still paralysed by far too much tinkering at the margins. Meanwhile, the flow of regulations coming from the EU is quietly skyrocketing.
• The Commission’s system of impact assessments results in sporadic, and poorly formulated assessments which are of negligible use in the policy-making process. We have found onlythree cases where a Commission proposal has been dropped as a result of an impact assessment — compared to the 10,800 acts that have been adopted in the EU since the introduction of EIA5 in 2003.
— The Commission’s lmpact Assessment Board lacks the autonomy and the teeth to stem the flow of new regulations, while the European Parliament has proven more of a driver of over-interference than an independent watchdog.
11 Based on Eurostat’s projections in 2008 of German GDP of €2,513,199,000,000.
12 HM Government, ‘Delivering simplification plans: a summary”, 11 December 2007, p. 7
13 HM GovernmentlBetterRegulation Executive, “Making your life simpler: simplification plans—a summary”, December
2008, p. 25
Reform is possible — but a radical new approach is needed
• There have been some genuine attempts at reform, but the UK’s current agenda is simply failing to curb the increasing flow of new regulations impacting on business and the wider economy. Without a more radical attempt to stem the flow, the cost of regulations will continue to rise year on year.
• The fact that a very high proportion of the total cost of regulation is coming from regulations negotiated not at Whitehall and Westminster but in Brussels and Strasbourg, shows that any reform agenda which does not focus primarily on curbing the flow of EU regulations will continue to fail.
Without a more radical attempt to stem the flow, the cost of regulations will continue to rise year on year
• Reform requires a whole new approach from both the UK Government and the EU Commission.
• Most importantly, policymakers need to fundamentally change their mentality and understand that state interference — at UK or EU level — can only be justified with conclusive evidence that the benefits of any such i nterference outweigh properly quantified costs.
• Specifically, the UK Government must turn both its lmpact Assessments and its regulatory budgets into bargaining tools at the EU level. For example, the UK’s opt-out from the EU’s Working Time Directive — under negotiation at the time of writing — is a clear case of where the Government should produce a robust lA, and take it to Brussels, arguing that it simply cannot accept proposals for which there is little support at home, and for which the estimated costs are so high. A similar strategy could have been pursued with the Agency Workers Directive. Such warnings, when based on robust evidence, will strengthen the UK’s negotiation position enormously.
The Government should introduce EU Commission style audit trails to help businesses keep up. There also needs to be real-time scrutiny of EU proposals at Westminster, with a bolstered new committee system which takes proper account of the fact that 72% of the cost of legislation is now EU-derived.
The UK Government must turn both its lmpact Assessments and its regulatory budgets into bargaining tools at the EU level
• The UK Government is in a strong position to draw up a new approach which leads to a radical reduction in new legislation. The Government should use its influence over EU budget negotiations to lever in concrete new measures to stop regulation — including a proposal to allow national parliaments to veto unnecessary laws.
• The UK Government must push hard for a new commitment among its EU partners to the idea of less regulation. The EU should introduce an independent and powerful European lmpact Assessment Board capable of stopping proposals which have not been properly quantified; a simple majority in the Council for scrapping proposals, and ‘€1 in, €1 out’ regulatory budgets in the Commission.
The UK Government must push hard for a new commitment among its EU partners to the idea of less regulation
Redan i februari 2009 analyserade OpenEurope EU-lagstiftningens inverkan på Englands ekonomi med rubriken ”Kontrollen gått förlorad? Ett decennium av EU-lagstiftning”
I utredningen på ca 78 sidor kan man läsa att:
1. Såväl mängden av lagstiftning som kostnaderna föranledda av dem stiger hela tiden.
2. Antalet lagar har gått upp i raketfart, från 10.800 1998 till 26.500 2008.
3. Årliga kostnader för England har i samma takt gått upp från 16,6 biljoner (10 pund är drygt 11 euro) 2005 till 28,7 biljoner 2008 (dvs. en ökning på 74%).
4. Med sådana summor kunde England låta bli beskatta sitt folk under ett års tid eller alternativt avkorta statsskulden med 24%.
Den här takten betyder att kostnaderna för hela EU år 2018 blir 3,017 triljoner, vilket betyder över 15.000 euro per varje EU-hushåll. Liknande analyser håller man på med i Frankrike och Tyskland. Och det är klart att vi har motsvarande kostnader fast man liksom inte får säga det högt! Och så pratar våra politiker om minskning av byråkrati och offentlig sektor?
Sedan fick vi nyligen av europarlamentariker Carl Haglund veta att EU vill ”sätta grekerna på plats” och att de grekiska myndigheterna har förskönat de ekonomiska siffrorna och har åtminstone sedan 1997 fört unionen bakom ljuset, Greklands statsskuld förväntas klättra upp till 125 procent av BNP detta år samt att Grekland är långt ifrån det enda landet som brutit mot pakten och att kasta ut Grekland ur eurosamarbetet ter sig inte heller som ett attraktivt alternativ för någon.
Hagmans sätt att måla upp en EU som lyckas styra med hård hand övertygar inte kritikerna eftersom:
1. Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) håller på att febrilt analysera hur allt i juridisk menig skall lösas om/när ett eller flera länder lämnar valutaunionen (euron) och/eller EU. ECB behöver således inte ”kasta ut” några länder.
2. Det är flera länder som kämpar med sin statsskuld och skuldsättningsgrad på över 100% av BNP är ingen raritet mera.
3. Och finska finansministeriets chef uttalade sig nyligen om läget med uttrycket ”Finland ligger i djupt träsk”.
4. Och hur mycket och hur länge har inte EU själv fört sina medlemsländers befolkningar bakom ljuset med alla bedrägerier och oegentligheter! Inte berättar man öppet heller att EU-presidenten kostar oss skattebetalare 300-400 miljoner i form av lön, säkerhetsarrangemang, stab, kontorsbyggnad osv. Eller slagsmålet om EU- parlamentarikernas lönehöjning samtidigt när t.ex. Finlands regering(ar) ber det finska folket nöja sig med mindre i lön och pension!
Hej Carl Haglund, berätta oss hur det framskrider med EU-beskattningen, det där som man inte får kalla beskattning men som ändå blir det 2014? Vet du något om det? Eller skall det också lättsamt beskrivas som stafettkarneval?
DET HÄR ÄR SAMMANFATTANDE AVSNITT UR OPEN EUROPES UTREDNING OM HUR EU BELASTAR SINA MEDLEMSLÄNDER MED SIN LAGSTIFTNING (Jag kommer småningom att översätta åtminstone delar av dessa axplock):
Out of control? Measuring a decade of EU regulation February 2009 By Mats Persson with Stephen Booth & Sarah Gaskell Edited by Lorraine Mullally
KEY FINDINGS:
Both the number and cost of regulations are going up all the time
• Over the past decade, the number of laws produced in both Whitehall and Brussels has skyrocketed. The number of legal acts in force in the EU has gone from 10,800 in 1998, to over 26,500 in 2008.
• However, while the number of regulations adopted each year is a useful indicator of trends, a far more meaningful assessment of the burden of regulation is the relative cost of those regulations to the economy.
• Since the UK launched its ‘Regulatory Reform Agenda’ in 2005, the annual cost of regulation has gone from £16.5 billion in 2005 to £28.7 billion in 2008 — an enormous increase of 74%.
Since the UK launched its ‘Regulatory Reform Agenda’ in 2005, the annual cost of regulation has gone from £16.5 billion in 2005 to £28.7 billion in 2008— an enormous increase of 74%
• Meanwhile, the estimated cumulative cost of regulations introduced in the UK between 1998 and 2008 is £148.2 billion. This is the equivalent of 10% of GDR1
• For the same amount, the UK Government could abolish income tax for one year2 or cut the national debt by 24%. EU legislation is responsible for 72% of the cost of regulations in the UK
• Of the cumulative cost of regulations introduced over the past decade, £106.6 billion, or 71.9%, had its origin in the EU. Similarly, the EU proportion of the average annual cost of regulations is 71.6%. of the cumulative cost of regulations introduced over the past decade, £106.6 billion, or 71.9%, had its origin in the EU
• Overall, the cost of EU legislation has gone up steadily year-on-year over the past decade. ln 2008 alone, EU legislation dating from 1998 cost the UK economy £18.5 billion — up from £12.2 billion in 2005.
• Taking the cumulative cost estimates, EU legislation since 1998 has cost the UK 23% more than the UK’s total gross contributions to the EU budget over the period 1998-2008.
1 Caiculated assuming that UK GDP in 2008 was E1,461,301,000,000, see Eurostat
http:llepp.eurostat.ec.europa.eulportal/page?_pageid=0,1 1361 73,0_45570701 &_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
2 According to the Treasury’s Latest Public Finances Databank (December 2008), income tax amounted to £151.9 billion in 07108, see http:Ilwww.hm-treasury.gov.uk!psf_statistics.htm
3 According to ONS figures, March 2008, UK national debt was £614,400,000,000, see
http:Ilwww.statistics.gov.uklccilnugget.asp?ID=277
4 According to the Treasury, the UK’s gross contributions to the EU budget 1998-2008 were £86.34 billion, see http:Ilwww.hm-treasury.gov.uklint_eu_statefraud.htm
At the current rate EU legislation will cost the UKE356 billion by 2018
• If the current flow of regulation continues, by 2018, the cost of EU legislation introduced since 1998 will have risen to more than £356 billion.5 This is around f 14,300 per British household.6 For the same amount, the UK Government could pay off almost 60% of the national debt7, or abolish incometaxfor2yearsand still leave theTreasury with a surplus.8
EU labour market Iaws alone account for 21% of the total cost of UK regulations
• Labour market legislation introduced over the past ten years has cost the UK economy £45 billion. 69% of this —£31 billion — came from the EU. This means that 21% of the overall cost of new regulations introduced in the UK between 1998 and 2008 can be sourced to the EU’s labour market laws alone. For this amount, the UK Government could cut corporation tax by two-thirds.9
Meanwhile, EU health and safety legislation coming into force in the last decade has cost the UK £5.7 billion.
EU agricultural regulations have cost British farmers over £2 billion, and the EU food labelling requirements have cost the UK £1.7 billion over the last ten years.
BERR is the UK’S ‘regulation factory’, with 73% of its annual cost of regulation coming from the EU
• Among UK Government departments, BERR (formerly the DTI) is the main facilitator of regulation in the UK. If the UK has a ‘regulation factory’, this is it. ln 2008 alone, the department accounted for regulatory costs to the economy of £12.8 billion — 45% of the total cost of regulation in that year. This was roughly £4 billion more than in 2007— or a 45% increase.
• Over the past ten years, 72.7% of the average annual cost of the regulation imposed by BERR stemmed from Brussels. ln 2008, the cost from EU regulation administered through BERR was £5.9 billion. This is enough to cut the rate of corporation tax by an average of 13%.10
• ln 2008, a staggering £9 billion of the cost of regulations coming from BERR arose from labour market regulations, of which £3.6 billion came from the EU. ln tum, £2.1 billion of this was due to one single regulation —the EU’s infamous 1999 Working Time Directive.
EU regulation accounts for more than 90% of the total cost of regulations from some Whitehall departments
• Meanwhile, EU regulations account for 98.8% of the cumulative cost of regulations coming from the FSA, 96.5% of those coming from the Ministry of Justice, 94.2% of regulations from DEFRA, and 94.3% from the HSE.
EU regulations cost the EU €1.4 trillion
• The cumulative cost of regulation introduced between 1998 and 2008 for all 27 EU member states is €1.4 trillion. Of this, 66%, or €928 billion, is EU-sourced.
• If current trends continue, by 2018, the cost of EU regulation introduced since 1998 will have risen to more than €3.017 trillion. This is over €1 5,000 per household in the EU.
• Since the Commission launched its ‘Better Regulation Agenda’ in 2005, the annual cost of EU legislation across the bbc has gone from €108 billion to over €161 billion — an increase of 50%.
5 The figure is the Present Value of the cost, caiculated using the discount rate of 3.5 per Cent specified in the Treasury Green Book, see http:llgreenbook.treasury.gov.ukfchaptero5.htm#discounting
6 Based on ONS’s es-timate of the number of UK househoids at 24.9 million in 2006, see http:Ilwww.statistics.gov.uklcci/nugget.asp?id=1 866
7 According to ONS figures, March 2008, UK national debt was E614,400,000,000, see
http:Ilwww.statistics.gov.uklcci/nugget.asp?ID=277
8 According to the Treasury’s Latest Public Finances Databank (December 2008), income tax amounted to £151.9 billion in 07108, see http:IANww.hm-treasury.gov.uklpsf_statistics.htm
9 According to the Treasury’s Latest Public Finances Databank (December 2008), corporation tax receipts were £46.4 billion in 07108, see http:IANww.hm-treasury.gov.uklpsf_statistics.htm
10 According to the Treasury’s Latest Public Finances Databank (December 2008), corporation tax receipts were £46.4 billion in 07108, see http:IAwww.hm-treasury.gov.uklpsf_statistics.htm http:/vww.hm-treasury.gov.ukIpsf_statistics.htm
• In 2008 alone the cost of regulation for the EU27 was €269.5 billion. This is up from €229.6 billion in 2007 and €183.4 billion in 2006.
• The cumulative cost to Germany of regulation introduced since 1998 is a staggering €280 billion. Of this amount, €184 billion (66%) is sourced to EU legislation — which is the equivalent of over 7% of the country’s GDR11
• In France the cost was €211 billion, of which almost €144 billion — 68% — came from the EU.
The Government’s claims to have cut the cost of regulation do not stack up — the Government must focus much more of its efforts on the EU level
• There is a clear mismatch between our findings and the Government’s claims to have cut down the administrative cost and burden of regulations in the last few years.12 ln December 2008, for example, the Government said that the administrative burden had been cut by £1.9 billion compared to the 2005 baseline measure.13
• It seems unlikely that the net administrative cost of regulations could be falling, while the overall cost of regulation — as captured by our figures — is increasing 50 markedly. Especially given that both sets of findings are based on the Government’s own figures.
• The UK’s reform agenda is ambitious. However, because of the large proportion of regulation stemming from the EU, the UK is losing control of it. For example, the new idea for departmental regulatory budgets is a good one, but since the regulatory costs stemming from some departments are so heavily driven by EU legislation, it is difficult to imagine how ministers will be able to control the budgets in practice. With EU regulations accounting for around 72% of the annual average cost of UK regulations, the Government effectively has control of less than 30% of the annual cost of regulation.
UK ministers sometimes sign off on EU proposals despite the lmpact Assessment showing the costs outweighing the benefits
• ln 2007 the Minister of Transport Stephen Ladyman, for instance, approved an lmpact Assessment which showed that the estimated costs of an EU Directive were £400 million a year while the benefits were £18.5 million a year. This encapsulates the UK Government’s weak approach to negotiations on EU legislation.
The EU’s attempts to cut regu!ation are para!ysed by too much tinkering at the margins
• Over the years the Commission’s commitment to ‘better regulation’ has resulted in very few tangible benefits. Despite noble efforts by a handful of reform-minded Commissioners such as Gunther Verheugen, regulatory reform in the EU is still paralysed by far too much tinkering at the margins. Meanwhile, the flow of regulations coming from the EU is quietly skyrocketing.
• The Commission’s system of impact assessments results in sporadic, and poorly formulated assessments which are of negligible use in the policy-making process. We have found onlythree cases where a Commission proposal has been dropped as a result of an impact assessment — compared to the 10,800 acts that have been adopted in the EU since the introduction of EIA5 in 2003.
— The Commission’s lmpact Assessment Board lacks the autonomy and the teeth to stem the flow of new regulations, while the European Parliament has proven more of a driver of over-interference than an independent watchdog.
11 Based on Eurostat’s projections in 2008 of German GDP of €2,513,199,000,000.
12 HM Government, ‘Delivering simplification plans: a summary”, 11 December 2007, p. 7
13 HM GovernmentlBetterRegulation Executive, “Making your life simpler: simplification plans—a summary”, December
2008, p. 25
Reform is possible — but a radical new approach is needed
• There have been some genuine attempts at reform, but the UK’s current agenda is simply failing to curb the increasing flow of new regulations impacting on business and the wider economy. Without a more radical attempt to stem the flow, the cost of regulations will continue to rise year on year.
• The fact that a very high proportion of the total cost of regulation is coming from regulations negotiated not at Whitehall and Westminster but in Brussels and Strasbourg, shows that any reform agenda which does not focus primarily on curbing the flow of EU regulations will continue to fail.
Without a more radical attempt to stem the flow, the cost of regulations will continue to rise year on year
• Reform requires a whole new approach from both the UK Government and the EU Commission.
• Most importantly, policymakers need to fundamentally change their mentality and understand that state interference — at UK or EU level — can only be justified with conclusive evidence that the benefits of any such i nterference outweigh properly quantified costs.
• Specifically, the UK Government must turn both its lmpact Assessments and its regulatory budgets into bargaining tools at the EU level. For example, the UK’s opt-out from the EU’s Working Time Directive — under negotiation at the time of writing — is a clear case of where the Government should produce a robust lA, and take it to Brussels, arguing that it simply cannot accept proposals for which there is little support at home, and for which the estimated costs are so high. A similar strategy could have been pursued with the Agency Workers Directive. Such warnings, when based on robust evidence, will strengthen the UK’s negotiation position enormously.
The Government should introduce EU Commission style audit trails to help businesses keep up. There also needs to be real-time scrutiny of EU proposals at Westminster, with a bolstered new committee system which takes proper account of the fact that 72% of the cost of legislation is now EU-derived.
The UK Government must turn both its lmpact Assessments and its regulatory budgets into bargaining tools at the EU level
• The UK Government is in a strong position to draw up a new approach which leads to a radical reduction in new legislation. The Government should use its influence over EU budget negotiations to lever in concrete new measures to stop regulation — including a proposal to allow national parliaments to veto unnecessary laws.
• The UK Government must push hard for a new commitment among its EU partners to the idea of less regulation. The EU should introduce an independent and powerful European lmpact Assessment Board capable of stopping proposals which have not been properly quantified; a simple majority in the Council for scrapping proposals, and ‘€1 in, €1 out’ regulatory budgets in the Commission.
The UK Government must push hard for a new commitment among its EU partners to the idea of less regulation
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